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A B S T R A C T   
We investigate the association between controlling shareholders' ownership (CS_Own) and firms' leverage de-
cisions in the Singaporean context. We examine whether the impact of ownership concentration on leverage 
differs across excess and lower control. We report that shareholders with excess control prefer leverage financing 
for an optimal capital structure and focus on value maximisation rather using leverage as a tool of minority 
shareholders' expropriation. Our analysis shows that firms capital structure significantly influences by the 
coalition of shareholders particularly decisions about leverage financing in addition to the firms' specific 
characteristics and institutional arrangements. Our empirical evidence shows that controlling shareholders with 
a lower fraction of equity are more concerned about limited holding thus prefer leverage over equity financing to 
inflate their equity stake to protect them from the potential takeovers and mergers. We report that capital 
structure decisions in Singapore are linked with the trade-off between the controlling shareholders' target of 
mitigating firm risk and their non-dilution entrenchment needs. Further, we found an inverted U-shaped asso-
ciation between control ownership and leverage financing. In terms of moderating effect of family-controlled 
ownership, our findings exhibit that leverage financing is less pronounced for family firms in Singapore due to 
the under-diversified investment portfolio.   
1. Introduction 
Historically, the empirical literature established the significance of 
leverage in mitigating agency conflict. The innate agency conflict is 
between the controlling shareholders and the external investors which 
influence firms' leverage decisions (Chee, Hooy, & Ooi, 2016). These 
agency issues potentially affect the firm's financial strategy, particularly 
decision about leverage. The leverage financing help to mitigate Type II 
agency conflict as the controlling shareholders are relatively more 
flexible in adjusting leverage ratio than equity share capital (de La 
Bruslerie & Latrous, 2012). 
The shareholders with higher controlling rights tend to face a trade- 
off between obtaining leverage financing and diluting their control over 
the board decision making (Boateng & Huang, 2017). The leverage fi-
nancing offers a counter measure to this dilemma while it is not pos-
sible by injecting external equity. The predominant research documents 
that the controlling shareholders tend to manipulate leverage as a 
channel to place financial resources at their disposal to facilitate tun-
nelling exercise (Casado, Burkert, Davila, & Oyon, 2016; Paligorova & 
Xu, 2012). Therefore, it's not surprising that several studies reported the 
role of effective CG in curbing the expropriation of minority share-
holders. 
Importantly, only a few studies have examined the impact of con-
trolling shareholders' ownership (CS_Own) on leverage financing. For 
example, Abdullah and Pok (2015) and Boubaker (2008) report a po-
sitive association between control ownership and leverage. While  
Santos, Moreira, and Vieira (2014) examine a sample of 12 Western 
European firms and report a negative relationship between ownership 
concentration and firms' leverage. Moreover, Nielsen (2006) who, 
among others, report a trade-off between the higher level of leverage 
and weak shareholding. A few other studies have estimated a U-shaped 
non-linear association between ownership structure and firms' leverage 
(see, for example, Agca & Mansi, 2008; Brailsford, Oliver, & Pua, 2002;  
Lo, Ting, & Yang, 2016). 
Importantly, the limited literature on the association between con-
trolling shareholders' ownership and leverage is quite heterogeneous. 
For example, in the US context, Crutchley, Jensen, Jahera Jr., and 
Raymond (1999) and Jensen, Solberg, and Zorn (1992) report that 
controlling shareholders tend to prefer low leverage financing and di-
vidend payments. Contrary to the US context, the controlling 
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shareholders of other developed countries may collude for their per-
sonal benefits to expropriate minority shareholders' interest. (Dyck & 
Zingales, 2004; Faccio & Lang, 2002; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & 
Shleifer, 1999). 
We contribute to the literature by examining the association be-
tween controlling shareholders' ownership (CS_Own) and the firms' 
leverage decisions in the Singaporean context. In particular, we in-
vestigate the impact of controlling shareholders' ownership on leverage 
financing across excess control (majority controlling shareholders) and 
lower control (controlling shareholders with a lower fraction of equity). 
We ascertain whether shareholders with an excess controlling stake 
prefer leverage for value maximisation or: alternatively, use as a tool of 
minority shareholders' expropriation. Theoretically, we link our 
econometric model with the context of Type II agency conflict as it 
arises between excess and lower control. In this regard, we conjecture 
that the association between controlling shareholders and leverage is 
presumably changed in accordance with the equity stake of controlling 
shareholders' due to the ‘incentive’ and ‘entrenchment’ effect. We pos-
tulate that excess and lower control ownership may exhibit distinct fi-
nancing behaviour towards leverage financing due to the difference in 
their privileges and investment priorities. To our knowledge, no prior 
study has examined the controlling shareholders' ownership and 
leverage financing across excess and lower control. 
Given the prevalence of higher level of concentrated ownership in 
the Singaporean market, we expect that the control ownership-leverage 
relationship leads to the ‘expropriation effect’. Although Singapore is an 
emerging market, its strong legal and institutional context is largely 
comparable with the developed market (Nguyen, Locke, & Reddy, 
2015). Singapore holds several traits of developed economies e.g., the 
strong legal and institutional settings, the effectiveness of the rule of 
law and adequate investors' protection which enhance the efficacy of 
CG in curbing the expropriation of minority shareholders thus support 
the likelihood of monitoring/incentive effect. The likelihood of both 
opposing effects of control ownership such as ‘expropriation effect’ and 
monitoring/incentive effect lead to the inverted-U shape association. 
We, therefore, further investigate whether controlling shareholders' 
ownership and firms' leverage nexus is multifaceted and lead to an 
inverted-U shape association in Singapore. 
It is well documented that the monitoring of professional managers 
becomes challenging particularly for the larger firms due to the de-
viation between cash flow rights and control rights (De Miguel, 
Pindado, & De la Torre, 2004). Therefore, the non-dilution motive for 
leverage is more likely to be strengthened when there is a separation of 
control and ownership rights. The deviation between the cash flow 
rights and control rights is common in controlled firms particularly in 
Western European and Eastern Asian countries (Claessens, Djankov, & 
Lang, 2000). The Singaporean context is recognized as a market with a 
higher level of ownership concentration (Claessens et al., 2000; Nguyen 
et al., 2015). We, therefore, further investigate the impact of the di-
vergence between cash flow rights and control rights on firms' leverage 
financing in the Singaporean context. 
The family-controlled firms considered as controlled ownership 
based on their distinct characteristics. Most of the family firms prefer 
leverage by considering it as non-dilutive security (Barth, Gulbrandsen, 
& Schonea, 2005). The family-controlled firms are more likely to be 
risk-averse and not prefer external borrowing despite the significance of 
leverage in a capital structure setting (Wiwattanakantang, 1999). Like 
other emerging markets, the Singaporean model of control ownership 
develops mainly through family control, state-owned ownership, pyr-
amidal structure and cross holding (La Porta et al., 1999; Nguyen et al., 
2015). 
So far, no prior study explores family ownership in the Singaporean 
context although family firms greatly contribute to the Singapore eco-
nomic development owing to the strong legal setting, adoption of ex-
tensive disclosure reporting standards and protection of the minority 
shareholders rights. We thus test the moderating role of the family- 
controlled firm on the relationship between controlling shareholders' 
ownership and leverage financing. 
Importantly, the Singaporean context is discussed in a very few 
cross countries studies such as (Claessens et al., 2000; Hanazaki & Liu, 
2007; La Porta et al., 1999) which unable to provide a definitive un-
derstanding of Singaporean context. Therefore, the present study is 
important to understand the unique environment of Singapore which 
differs from most emerging economies in terms of both institutional 
efficiency and regulatory enforcement yet have other features in 
common with emerging markets (Demirbag and Yaprak, 2015). In 
contrast to other emerging economies, the Singaporean market hold 
several characteristics of developed markets in terms of its well-orga-
nized capital market, strong protection to minority shareholders and 
the national governance quality. To this end, we conduct a detailed 
analysis of governance attributes and capital structure to investigate 
whether the control ownership-leverage nexus in Singapore takes place 
on the line of other emerging economies, or it's context-specific. 
Our core findings reveal that controlling shareholders with an ex-
cess controlling stake do less rely on leverage financing to minimize the 
likelihood of default risk. Our evidence shows that controlling share-
holders of the Singaporean market tend to use leverage financing for an 
optimal capital structure and focus on value maximisation rather using 
leverage as a tool of minority shareholders' expropriation. In addition, 
we report that controlling shareholders with a lower fraction of equity 
are more concerned about limited holding thus prefer leverage over 
equity financing to inflate their equity stake to protect them from the 
potential takeovers and mergers. Another noteworthy finding of this 
study reflecting that unlike other emerging markets, the strong dis-
closure-based environment and efficient monitoring mechanisms in 
Singapore effectively protect minority’ interests, thus separation of 
ownership and control has no significant impact on leverage financing. 
Further, our empirical evidence shows that controlling shareholders 
first increase the leverage financing to maintain an optimal capital 
structure indicating ‘active monitoring effect’ and at a certain 
threshold, prefer to reduce the leverage level reflecting the ‘risk re-
duction/incentive effect’ leading to an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between control ownership and leverage. Finally, our findings show a 
negative interaction effect of family-controlled firms suggesting that 
family controlling shareholders are more averse towards the higher 
level of leverage due to the risk of financial distress and bankruptcy and 
as a result of having poorly and under-diversified leadership portfolio. 
Our empirical evidence shows that the shareholders with a lower 
controlling stake in Singapore prefer leverage over equity financing to 
inflate their equity stake. This reflects that regardless of the disclosure- 
based environment and strong governance arrangements in Singapore, 
minority shareholders are concerned about limited holding. Our find-
ings highlight the need for the CG regulator to specifically reconsider 
the role of minority shareholders regarding involvement in the board 
key decision making particularly in capital structure decisions. The 
remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Next section describes 
the institutional background of the Singaporean market. Section 3 
discusses the underlying theory and develops testable hypotheses.  
Section 4 describes our data and sample selection procedures and ex-
plain the measurement of variables. Section 5 and 6 presents our em-
pirical modelling and results respectively and finally, section 7 presents 
the conclusion and implication of the study. 
2. Institutional background 
The regulations and the disclosure standards of the Singaporean 
market fall under the domain of more than one institution, an example 
being the Securities Industry Council, Monetary Authority of Singapore 
and the Registrar of Companies and Commercial Affairs Department. 
These departments are well integrated with each other regarding the 
scrutiny of the standards and the enforcement of regulations which 
maintain a higher level of governance transparency. 
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Contrary to the traditional dynamics of emerging markets, 
Singapore is recognized as a market with a strong rule of law; yet the 
nature of the Singaporean regulatory state does not make it a strictly 
market economy. In addition, the market-based financial system, well- 
developed capital market and the national governance quality of 
Singapore makes it the most efficient setting across the Asian region 
(Heugens, Van Essen, & Van Oosterhout, 2009; Nguyen et al., 2015). In 
contrast to other emerging markets, the judicial environment of Sin-
gapore provides strong protection for minority shareholders under the 
law: indeed, it is regularly ranked among the highest average country 
scores for corporate governance (CG) quality across Asia 
(Chuanrommanee & Swierczek, 2007; CLSA, 2010, 2012). 
The CG framework of Singapore is recognized as a disclosure-based 
mechanism which accentuates extensive disclosure reporting and effi-
cient monitoring which in turn strengthen a strong corporate culture. 
Importantly, the institutional setting and governance structure in 
Singapore differs from most of the Asian and Continental European 
firms on several counts. For example, the Singaporean market follows 
the Anglo-American model of CG which accentuate the board in-
dependence and effectiveness of board committees. In addition, 
Singaporean CG is supported by the principle-based approach that 
primarily adopted from Western jurisdictions (Nguyen et al., 2015). 
The equity market of Singapore is tightly held among government, 
multinationals, regional corporations, large business groups, takeovers 
and entrepreneurial families. Further, to make the ownership more 
accountable, the companies act is specifically amended which restrict 
local and international firms in Singapore to maintain the publicly 
available data regarding the information of beneficial owners. 
Moreover, shareholders who control voting rights through other 
person/firms or other controlling mechanisms such as pyramiding, 
cross holdings and business groups also required to disclose relevant 
information. This is supplemented by the Singapore code of takeovers, 
mergers and quasi-legislative enactments namely ‘SGX listing manual. 
Given the distinct characteristics, the Singapore corporate sector pro-
vides an interesting experimental setting to enhance the conceptual 
understanding of the relationship between controlling shareholders’ 
ownership and the firm leverage decisions. 
3. Literature review and hypothesis development 
Since the seminal research of Modigliani and Miller (1958), several 
studies focus on firms' internal characteristics and external dynamics 
which impact capital structure decisions (De Jong, Rezaul, & Nguyen, 
2008; Rajan & Zingales, 1995). The agency cost theory argues that firms 
can maintain an optimal capital structure by mitigating the cost arising 
from the conflict across the shareholders (Jensen, 1986). These agency 
conflicts arise as a result of the diversion between ownership and 
control. Moreover, prior literature link capital structure theory in the 
behavioural context of the agency relationship between principal and 
agent. The static narrative of agency context predicts that professional 
managers tend to use their power and control to extract private benefit 
at the cost of value maximising actions of the firm (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). 
Further, financial hierarchy theory suggests a hierarchy of finan-
cing; to employ internal funds in the first preference, followed by 
leverage financing, and finally, the equity shareholdings. The extant 
literature has addressed the dynamics of capital structure from various 
expect while the understanding of how firms choose their capital 
structure is an important empirical question which is extensively ad-
dressed by the extant literature. 
The trade-off theory postulate that firms maximise shareholders 
value when the benefits of leverage (e.g. the disciplinary mechanism of 
leverage and the tax shield) equal the marginal cost of leverage (such as 
financial distress and bankruptcy cost). Broadly speaking, trade-off 
theory speaks that firms can target their optimal capital structure by a 
trade-off between tax benefits and financial distress costs. Moreover, 
there is a possibility that the leverage financing may use by the con-
trolling shareholders for minority shareholders' expropriation. Further, 
the probability of bankruptcy would be greater when there is a higher 
level of leverage financing, particularly beyond the optimal level. The 
controlling shareholders are reluctant to raise equity as the market 
value of shares tend to be undervalued, thus prefer leverage financing 
(Myers & Majluf, 1984). Furthermore, in most of the developed 
economies, leverage financing serves as a mechanism to discipline 
management (Abor, 2008). In the opposing scenario, controlling 
shareholders prefer leverage financing as a tool to maintain investors' 
confidence (Ross, 1977). 
3.1. Excess and lower control ownership 
Ownership concentration is prevalent across emerging and devel-
oped market and literature emphasize the role of leverage financing in 
mitigating the agency conflicts (Arslan-A, Karan, & M., 2006). La Porta 
et al. (1999) has examined 27 developed countries and report highly 
concentrated ownership while Claessens et al. (2000) reveal that 66% 
of firms in nine East Asian countries are managed and control by large 
controlling shareholders. However, the empirical literature related to 
ownership concentration and leverage shows mixed results. For ex-
ample, Schmid, Achleitner, and Kaserer (2013) examine a sample of 
German firms and argues that controlling shareholders prefer leverage 
financing to maintain their controlling stake. Lundstrum (2009) points 
out that in the case of high concentration of controlling rights the block- 
holders prefer a higher level of leverage which is supportive in mon-
itoring firms' strategic affairs. Moreover, Mishra and McConaughy 
(1999) reveal a negative association between ownership concentration 
and leverage financing and document that the controlling shareholders 
intended to minimize controlling risk exposure. In contrast, Santos et al. 
(2014) examine a sample of 12 Western European firms and report a 
negative relationship between ownership concentration and firms 
leverage. Lee and Kuo (2014) document that shareholders with lower 
voting rights presumably prefer less leverage financing to avert the 
scrutiny of creditors. 
We classify our sample into two categories i.e. excess control (majority 
controlling shareholders) and lower controlling stake (controlling share-
holders with a lower fraction of equity) and determine their impact on 
leverage financing in the Singaporean context. We examine whether the 
higher level of controlling shareholder ownership directly associate with 
higher leverage level. In addition, we ascertain whether shareholders with 
an excess controlling stake are using leverage for minority shareholders' 
expropriation and link our econometric model in the context of Type II 
agency conflict. For example, the shareholders with excess controlling rights 
may avoid to issuing shares to maintain their controlling stake which leads 
to monitory shareholders' expropriation. 
The rationale of excess control and leverage relationship is evident 
as the of exacerbation of traditional agency conflicts as a result of 
ownership concentration may have a substantial implication on the 
corporate sectors and the economy as a whole. On the other hand, 
controlling shareholders with a lower fraction of equity (lower control) 
may also prefer leverage over equity to inflate their controlling stake to 
protect them from expropriation. Moreover, shareholders with a lower 
controlling stake have less incentive to monitor managers and prefer 
higher leverage. We conjecture that the association between controlling 
shareholders and leverage is presumably changed in accordance with 
the controlling shareholders' stake in equity ownership due to the ‘in-
centive’ and ‘entrenchment’ effect. We also expect that excess and lower 
control ownership may exhibit distinct financing behaviour towards 
leverage financing due to the difference in their privileges and invest-
ment priorities. we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1. The relationship between controlling shareholders ownership 
(CS_Own) and leverage financing differs across Excess control and lower 
control ownership. 
Q.A. Amin and J. Liu   International Review of Financial Analysis 72 (2020) 101591
3
3.2. Separation of ownership and control 
The prior studies, such as La Porta et al. (1999) and Claessens et al. 
(2000) primarily recognized that most of the non-US and East Asian 
firms display a higher magnitude of the separation of control rights and 
cash flow rights. The higher degree of separation of ownership and 
control is related to the larger interest of the controlling shareholders to 
divert the firm resources for personal benefits at the cost of the minority 
shareholders' interest (Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & Lang, 2002). 
Another potential reason for controlling shareholders' preference for 
leverage over equity is to develop an impression for potential investors 
that management is maintaining a culture of good CG practice even 
there is a significant divergence between control rights and cash flow 
rights. In contrast, higher leverage may restrict the controlling share-
holders from tunnelling the firm's resources such as direct the firms' 
assets, personal loan guarantees, asset sales, and future business con-
tract to themselves for personal gain which may induce controlling 
shareholders towards lower leverage (Du & Dai, 2005). 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) linked the traditional agency issue with 
the implications of the separation of ownership and control by con-
sidering the agency cost. Likewise, Maury & Pajuste, 2002 reveal that 
effective CG tends to address the agency problems particularly the is-
sues caused by the deviation of ownership and control. Prior studies 
such as (Claessens et al., 2002; Lemmon & Lins, 2003) report a negative 
impact of separation of cash flow and control rights on firm value.  
Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) investigate a sample of Swedish firms and 
report that separation of ownership and control rights, particularly in 
family firms, use multiple voting shares which negatively impact on 
firms' value. 
Faccio and Lang (2002) investigate a large European data set and 
highlight the proportional sharing benefit in the case of separation of 
ownership and control. Nenova (2003) document that the legal en-
vironment, takeover regulations, the law in order and governance 
regulations define much of the variations across countries in terms of 
the impact of the separation of ownership and control. Therefore, it's 
more likely that in the case of the higher divergence between cash flow 
and control rights; the controlling shareholders may prefer leverage 
over equity finance to inflate their controlling stake for minority 
shareholders' expropriation. Therefore, in accordance with the existing 
literature, we expect that the higher level of separation of cash flow and 
control rights directly influence the leverage decisions in Singaporean 
market. We hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2. A higher magnitude of separation between cash flow rights 
and control rights is positively associated with leverage financing. 
3.3. An inverted U-shaped nonlinear association between controlling share 
ownership and leverage 
The controlling shareholders prefer a lower leverage level to avoid 
the scrutiny of lending agencies thus provide effective monitoring and 
better strategic decisions which lead to firms' higher performance 
(Nguyen et al., 2015). Jensen (1986) predict that the firm leverage 
negatively impacts on external equity financing which in turn increase 
the shareholder stake of managerial ownership. In addition, controlling 
shareholders can limit the managerial entrenchment by acquiring less 
leverage finance which reduces the risk of financial distress (Lee & Kuo, 
2014). Alternatively, entrenchment motives induce professional man-
agers to enhance leverage level above the optimal threshold which 
more likely to boost their voting strength to influence corporate stra-
tegies (Harris & Raviv, 1988; Stulz, 1988). 
Moreover, the entrenched managers tend to prefer a higher leverage 
level as a momentary tool to build up an impression of selling assets or 
restructuring business units thus initiate a pre-arrange takeover at-
tempts by outsiders (Berger, Ofek, & Yermack, 1997). K. Li, Lu, Mittoo, 
and Zhang (2015) reveal that higher controlling rights inflate 
entrenchment effects which more likely to lead a higher risk of financial 
distress. In a similar vein, Lundstrum (2009) reveals that blockholders 
prefer higher leverage to strengthens their ultimate control which in 
turn helpful in monitoring firms' strategic affairs. 
Contrary to equity financing, the high leverage firms face the in-
creased pressure of debt repayment and default risk when leverage 
exceeds a certain level of threshold. Therefore, in the case of a non-
linear relationship, a positive relationship between controlling share-
holders and leverage continues up to a certain level of threshold i.e. 
optimal level, as the controlling shareholders intend to maintain their 
controlling stake; however, financial distress risk is a significant con-
cern for the controlling shareholders which induce them to reduce the 
leverage at a certain threshold level. Therefore, on average, firms' 
leverage is more likely to be reduced at a higher stake of controlling 
shareholders. In addition, when the controlling shareholding increases 
their stake, it tends to converge their interests with outside share-
holders and as a result, leverage is less likely to be used as a tool of 
minority shareholders' expropriation. 
Given the prevalence of concentrated ownership and family-con-
trolled ownership in the Singaporean market, we expect that control 
ownership-leverage relationship lead to the ‘expropriation effect’. 
However, Singapore holds several characteristics of developed econo-
mies e.g., the strong legal and institutional settings, the effectiveness of 
the rule of law and adequate investor’ protection which enhance the 
efficacy of CG in curbing the expropriation of minority shareholders 
thus support the likelihood of monitoring/incentive effect. Thus, the 
likelihood of both opposing effects of control ownership such as ‘ex-
propriation effect’ and ‘monitoring/incentive effect’ presumably lead to 
the inverted-U shape association. These evidences motivate us to in-
vestigate whether there is an inverted U-shaped non-linear association 
between controlling shareholders' ownership and firm leverage. We 
hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 3. There is an inverted U-shaped nonlinear association between 
controlling shareholders' ownership (CS_Own) and leverage financing. 
3.4. Moderating effect of family ownership 
Moreover, the empirical literature related to family-controlled 
ownership and leverage shows mixed results. For example, Setia- 
Atmaja (2010) investigate a sample of 316 Australian firms and docu-
ment that family-controlled firms prefer high leverage compared to 
non-family firms. The study further reveals that family-controlled firms 
prefer a higher level of leverage financing to influence minority 
shareholders in board key decisions. Margaritis & Psillaki (2010) point 
out that family-controlled firms prefer leverage financing as a dis-
ciplinary tool to mitigate the shareholder-manager agency issues sug-
gesting a positive relationship between family ownership and financial 
leverage. Likewise, Croci, Doukas, and Gonenc (2011) document a 
positive relationship between family ownership and leverage financing.  
Setia-Atmaja, Tanewski and Skully (2009) and King and Santor (2008) 
examine the Australian and Canadian family firms, respectively and 
report a relatively higher leverage level than non-family firms. 
In the opposing view, Hiebl (2012) claim that risk aversion is most 
dominant attribute of family ownership firms. Bianco, Bontempi, 
Golinelli, and Parigi (2013) highlight that family firms' shareholders 
more likely to concentrate their personal incentives thus prefer lower 
return with known risks instead of higher returns with uncertain risks. 
The family-controlled firms may prefer to avoid external monitoring, 
particularly from creditors and do less reliant on leverage financing.  
Gama and Galvão (2012) report that family shareholders prefer a 
higher level of equity than leverage financing to avoid the financial 
distress. Schmid et al. (2013) document that to avoid bankruptcy and 
financial distress family-controlled firms in countries where the creditor 
rights are relatively higher, tend to prefer lower leverage financing than 
non-family firms. Ampenberger et al. (2011) examine a sample of 
Q.A. Amin and J. Liu   International Review of Financial Analysis 72 (2020) 101591
4
German firms and report that family firms relatively less rely on 
leverage financing compared to non-family firms whilst a similar result 
for French family firms document by Margaritis and Psillaki (2010). 
Given the study is in the context of Singapore where family-con-
trolled ownership is highly concentrated, we conjecture that family- 
controlled ownership as a moderating variable may change the strength 
and direction of the causal relationship between controlling share-
holders' ownership and leverage financing. We hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 4. The family-controlled ownership negatively moderates the 
association between controlling shareholders' ownership and leverage 
financing. 
4. Data and sample 
The Singapore Exchange Ltd. (SGX) being the primary regulator of 
publicly listed firms in Singapore, provide two different exchange 
market requires different listening requirements, such as Mainboard 
and Catalist. The listed firms of Singapore are required to disclose their 
CG best practice compliance statement in their annual report, while the 
compliance with the CG Code is not mandatory. Our preliminary 
sample consists of all Singaporean non-financial listed firms of SGX 
Mainboard. We exclude Financial industries (SIC codes, 6000–6999), 
Utilities (SIC codes, 4900–4999), and firms listed on the SGX Catalist, 
subject to differences in listing and regulatory requirements (Bauer, 
Frijns, Otten, & Tourani-Rad, 2008; Du & Dai, 2005; Nguyen et al., 
2015; Schultz, Tan, & Walsh, 2010; Yusuf, Yousaf, & Saeed, 2018). In 
addition, we excluded all those firms whose ownership or shareholders' 
voting data is incomplete, as it's not possible to track the pyramidal 
ownership until to have access to ultimate controlling shareholders. We 
also exclude those firm's data which are either, completely missing or 
available data showing less than half of the firm's ownership rights. This 
results in an unbalanced panel dataset of 310 firms covering the period 
2008–2016. The Singaporean code of CG, first promulgated by the CG 
committee in 2001, hereafter reviewed in 2005 and became effective 
with a substantive amendment from September 2007. We, therefore, 
selected the sample year 2008 as it is one year after the promulgation of 
revised CG regulations in Singapore. In addition, the Singaporean code 
revised in 2012 mainly to ensure a balanced composition of corporate 
boards in terms of executive and independent INEDs. We test the re-
lease of regulations (2012) as a natural exogenous shock to determine 
its impact on the relationship between control ownership and leverage 
decisions. The financial data are extracted from Worldscope ‘One 
Banker’ (financial module), while ownership and voting data are ob-
tained from firms' individual annual reports and supplemented by 
Worldscope ‘One Banker’ (Ownership module). 
4.1. Measurement of variables 
Following prior studies such as Claessens et al. (2000) and Faccio 
and Lang (2002), we measure controlling share ownership (CS_Own) by 
collecting control rights and direct ownership related to the largest 
shareholders and estimate in our model as an independent variable. 
In order to conduct an in-depth analysis, we classify our sample into 
two categories i.e. firms dominated with the excess control (majority 
controlling shareholders) and lower control (controlling shareholders 
with a lower fraction of equity) and determine their impact on leverage 
financing. We classify a firm as an excess control when the sum of 
voting rights held by the first three largest controlling shareholders is 
50% or above the total equity (family members or others as per the 
agreement), while the voting stake of the first three largest shareholders 
is 20% or less of total equity is considered as a lower control. We es-
timate the financing behaviour of controlling shareholders across excess 
and lower control as Type II agency conflict (principal vs principal) as it 
arises between excess and lower. In addition to our main independent 
variable i.e. controlling shareholders ownership, we further investigate 
the magnitude of separation of cash flow rights and control rights using 
three different wedge scales and determine their impact on firm 
leverage decisions. These wedge scales examine the magnitude of di-
vergence between ownership and control, while in a theoretical con-
text, a higher degree of wedge scales lead to Type II agency conflict. We 
defined wedge scale-1 as the fractional difference between cash flow 
rights and control rights. The wedge scale-2 measured as the percentage 
of cash flow rights to control rights of the largest shareholders, whilst 
wedge scale-3 is the dummy variable that equals to 1 if control rights of 
the largest shareholders are greater than cash flow rights. 
We estimate the role of family-controlled firms as a moderating 
variable to determine whether the association between controlling 
shareholders' ownership is influenced by family-controlled ownership. 
We classify a firm as a family-controlled firm, where a family member is 
the CEO or chairman and hold at least 5% equity. Based on this cri-
terion, we found that 43.2% of the sample as family firms.1 
We estimate leverage as the main dependent variable of our model. 
The extant literature used two alternative measures of firm leverage by 
considering the market or the book value (Antoniou, Guney, & Paudyal, 
2008; Henry Agyei-Boapeah, 2015; Sogorb-Mira, 2005). Therefore, for 
the robustness of our results, we incorporate two alternate measure-
ments of leverage e.g. based on the book value of equity and market 
value of equity. In addition, we include six core factors affecting firm 
leverage in our model estimation as control variables such as firm size, 
market-to-book-ratio (MTB), tangibility, NDTS (non-debt tax shield), 
profitability and Volatility (Schmid et al., 2013). We begin our analysis 
by examining the impact of controlling shareholders' ownership on the 
firms' leverage by considering the full sample: 
= + + +Debts (k) CS_Own ControlsX itit 0 1 it k,it (1) 
where debts represent firm leverage measured with two alternate cri-
teria i.e. book and market value, while CS_Own is controlling share-
holders ownership. Moreover, i and t represent cross-sections and time 
period respectively, while εit is the error term. In addition, we test 
whether there is a non-linear association between CS_Own and firm 
leverage. Accordingly, we include CS_Own and its square value 
(CS_Own2) into model estimation: 
= + + + +nDebts (k) CS_Own CS_Ow ControlsX itit 0 1 it 2 2it k,it
(2) 
where CS_Own representing controlling shareholders ownership. The 
square value (CS_Own2) determines whether there is a quadratic rela-
tion between controlling shareholders' ownership and financial 
leverage. Moreover, we expect a positive coefficient sign of CS_Own 
while a negative coefficient on CS_Own2 representing the highest point.  
Table 1 explains the definitions of the variable used in the study. 
5. Empirical model 
The extant literature reports a significant influence of ownership 
structure on the firms' leverage, however, most of the prior studies of 
capital structure have ignored the endogeneity problem. (Amin & 
Williamson, 2020; De La Bruslerie & Latrous, 2012; Lo et al., 2016). 
GMM estimator produces a more consistent and efficient estimation 
after controlling the potential source of endogeneity. Moreover, GMM 
modelling supported by the prior study of Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1991) who used the lagged levels of ownership variables by con-
sidering the changes in ownership structure over time. 
We thus estimate our model by employing GMM estimator and 
compare its results with static models i.e. OLS and fixed effects to un-
derstand the biases that arise from ignoring endogeneity. 
1 Prior studies employ a number of different definitions to define what con-
stitutes a family firm (Hasso and Duncan, 2013; Weiss 2014). Therefore, the 
present study defined family ownership based on literature. 
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6. Empirical results 
6.1. Summary statistics 
Following La Porta et al. (1999) and Claessens et al. (2000), we 
calculate the ultimate cash flow and control rights in the hands of the 
10 largest controlling shareholders. Therefore, panel A of Table 2 shows 
that on average, the concentration of control rights is 67.4%, while cash 
flow rights are 64.5%, indicating that control rights are slightly greater 
than cash flow rights by considering that the firm level largest con-
trolling shareholders has at least 5% of the total voting stake. These 
statistics congruent with the findings of (Claessens et al., 2000) who 
reported that control rights are larger than cash flow rights particularly 
in the case of Indonesia, Japan, and the Singaporean firms.2 It is notable 
that unlike other emerging economies the degree of separation between 
cash flow rights and control rights in Singapore is not significantly high. 
This separation between cash flow rights and control rights is because 
of the presence of cross holdings, business groups and pyramids own-
ership in the Singaporean market which allow controlling shareholders 
to dominate in board decision making. 
On average, the first-largest shareholder has 27.3% of the control 
rights and 24.5% of cash flow rights. While the average control rights 
(cash flow) for the second and third-largest shareholders are 13.5% 
(11.4%) and 6.71% (5.66%), respectively. These statics exhibits a 
significant level of controlling shareholders' ownership in the 
Singaporean market which is congruent with the findings of Claessens 
et al. (2000), who report that control rights are greater than cash flow 
rights particularly in Indonesia, Japan, and Singapore. 
Notably, first, second and the third wedge ratio are 2.90, 1.04 and 
1.15, respectively, indicating a lower level of divergence between 
ownership and control in the Singaporean market. The growing lit-
erature reveals that the higher magnitudes of separation between 
ownership and control lead to Type II agency conflict. However, this 
lower level of wedge across three largest controlling owners is not 
supporting the likelihood of the risk of minority shareholders' ex-
propriation in the Singaporean context which contradicts the scenario 
of other emerging markets. Moreover, this marginal wedge ratio is 
because of the dominance of cross holdings, business groups and pyr-
amidal ownership in Singapore. Importantly, Singaporean governance 
setting substantively focus on investors' confidence and minority pro-
tection which motivate us to investigate whether this marginal diver-
sion between ownership and control may impact on agency relationship 
and leverage decisions. 
Table 2 shows that 63.4% of the Singaporean firms are dominated 
by a higher level of shareholders' control (Excess control), while 21.7% 
of the firms are representing the lower level of shareholders' control 
(non-majority control, i.e. controlling shareholders with a lower frac-
tion of equity). Overall, these statistics indicate a dominating position 
of the majority controlling shareholders over non-majority control in 
Singapore corporate sector. Panel B of Table 2 illustrates the control 
rights and cash flow rights across different ownership structures. The 
family-control ownership is the most frequent ownership type among 
the largest controlling shareholders (43.3%). In this regard, our analysis 
shows that Singaporean family-controlled firms have substantial re-
presentation the corporate board and key managerial roles. In addition, 
we argue that where the family is the largest shareholder, the firms 
Table 1 
Explains the definitions of the variable used in the study.    
Variables definitions and sources  
Variable Description  
Control rights (CS_Own) Proportion of control rights owned by the 10 largest controlling shareholder 
CS_Own2 Square value of control rights owned by the controlling shareholder 
Cash flow rights Proportion of cash flow rights owned by the 10 largest controlling shareholder 
Excess Control (Majority) Sum of the voting rights held by the first three largest controlling shareholders is 50% or above 
Lower Control (Non-majority) Sum of the voting rights held by the first three largest controlling shareholders is 20% or less 
Control rights (1st largest) Proportion of First largest control rights 
Control rights (2ndlargest) Proportion of Second largest control rights 
Control rights (3rd largest) Proportion of Third largest control rights 
Cashflow rights (1st largest) Proportion of First largest cash flow rights 
Cashflow rights (2ndlargest) Proportion of Second largest cash flow rights 
Cashflow rights (3rd largest) Proportion of Third largest cashflow rights 
Wedge 1 Fractional difference between cash-flow rights and control rights 
Wedge 2 Percentage of cash-flow rights scaled by control rights of the largest controlling shareholders 
Wedge 3 Dummy variable that equals to 1 if control rights of largest shareholders are greater than cash-flow rights,0 otherwise 
FCO Proportion of family-control ownership 
Family managers representation Proportion of family managers representation in family-control firms 
Family board representation Proportion of family board members representation in family-control own 
Pyramidal Ownership Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm control through pyramidal ownership structure, 0 otherwise 
Non-Family Control Proportion of family-control ownership 
Corporation Proportion of Corporations 
Financial Proportion of Financial firms 
State (GLCs) Proportion of government-link Corporations 
Leverage (Book value) Ratio of total debt scaled by total debt plus book value of equity 
Leverage (Market value) Ratio of total debt scaled by total debt plus market value of equity 
Ln (Firm Size) Natural logarithm of book value of total assets 
Ln (MTB) Market value of the equity scaled by book value of equity(natural logarithm) 
Tangibility Ratio of Fixed Assets (property, plant and equipment) scaled by Total Assets 
NDTS Non-debt tax shield: Annual depreciation expense scaled by net assets 
Profitability Ratio of EBITDA to total assets 
Volatility Standard deviation of the change in operating EBITDA over the previous four years 
Regulations 2012 Dummy variable that equals to 1 if the sample year is 2012, 0 otherwise 
Source of Data Firm's annual reports; Worldscope (Ownership & Financial modules), Osiris data base 
2 These statistics are marginally different from the descriptive statistics re-
ported by Claessens et al. (2000). Basically, Claessens et al. (2000) examine the 
Singaporean firm using the sample period of 1996–1998, i.e. the period during 
which the CG in Singapore was in the developing stage. Whilst the present study 
takes into account the fresh data set i.e. 2008–2016 thus revise the previously 
established results regarding the separation of ownership and control in the 
Singaporean context. 
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prefer to appoint their family members as a representative at man-
agerial and senior-level positions. For example, our statistics show that 
the Singaporean family firms' members have 29.4% representation on 
the corporate board. Further, our data analysis shows that on average, 
17.1% of the family-controlled firms appointed their members at se-
nior-level positions. 
We conjecture that the presence of these family representatives has 
a significant impact on firm-level CG which help to alleviate Type I 
agency conflict (principal-agent), whilst may possibly lead to the Type 
II agency conflict. For example, in the case of family-controlled own-
ership, the interest of family-managers and controlling shareholders are 
aligned while at the same time these family managers presumably serve 
the private benefits of the family-control shareholders at the cost of 
external/minority shareholders. Going forward, the second-largest 
ownership type is the GLCs (24.1%), indicating that like China, GLCs is 
also common in the Singaporean market. Further, controlling owner-
ship across non-family, financial firms and other firms are 17.5%, 
11.4% and 7.8% respectively. 
Panel A of Table 3 presents the capital stake of controlling share-
holders for a threshold ranging from 0 to 100%. We can see that 20.3% 
of the sample firms have the highest controlling stake e.g. ranging be-
tween 60%–70%, indicating a relatively higher percentage of control-
ling shareholding in the Singaporean corporate sector. Panel B presents 
the leverage based on the controlling stake of the firms. We can see that 
leverage increases with the rise in controlling ownership, however, 
after reaching a certain threshold (e.g., 40% and 35% for book and 
market value, respectively), the leverage level starts decreasing with 
the increase in controlling ownership indicating an inverted U-shape 
trend. 
We conduct a univariate analysis of mean and median difference 
tests across firms' characteristics and present the findings in Table 4. We 
categories all observations into two main groups based on leverage 
level: excess leverage firms and low leverage firms. Panel A shows that 
firms with excess leverage employ a relatively low concentration of 
controlling stake than those with low leverage (64.3 vs. 70.5). Broadly 
speaking, this result reflects that firms with a lower level of controlling 
stake tend to prefer more leverage financing than firms with a higher 
controlling stake. Interestingly, excess leverage group shows a rela-
tively lower proportion of family-controlled firms (41.5) than lower 
leverage group (45.1), supporting the argument that family firms' in 
Singapore are not preferred leverage over equity to maintain their 
controlling stake. In addition, Pyramidal ownership firms have a higher 
leverage ratio than non-pyramidal firms. However, there is no sig-
nificant difference in GLCs across excess and lower leverage groups. 
Moreover, results show that the high leverage firms are larger in size 
than those of low leverage firms. The univariate analyses further reflect 
that there is not a significant difference between both the groups re-
garding control variables such as MTB, tangibility, NDTS, profitability 
and volatility. 
Panel B of Table 4 presents a preliminary investigation to under-
stand how controlling shareholders ownership influence leverage fi-
nancing. Using the mean values, L_1 represents the book value of 
leverage while L_2 denotes the market value of leverage across all 
groups i.e. full sample, family ownership, GLCs and pyramidal owner-
ship. The observations are classified into deciles, incorporating the 
bottom (lower) and the top (highest) group of control ownership. Be-
fore considering other factors, the analysis shows that firms' leverage 
constantly decreases with the increase in the concentration of control-
ling ownership reflecting that as the level of controlling stake increases, 
firms reduce their leverage financing. However, the analysis shows that 
family-controlled and pyramidal ownership firms are relatively more 
rely on leverage financing than GLCs group firms. 
6.2. Impact of controlling shareholders' ownership (CS_Own) on firms' 
leverage 
We begin with our baseline analysis by examining the relationship 
between controlling shareholders' ownership (CS_Own) and leverage 
Table 2 
Panel A of presents the summary statistics of the variable used in the study. 
Panel B illustrates the control rights and cash flow rights across different 
ownership structures.          
Panel A. Summary statistics of ownership and control  
Variables Mean Median Min Max P25 P75 SD  
Control rights (CS-Own) 67.4 63.1 23.1 93.7 28.1 83.1 18.7 
Cash flow rights 64.5 62.2 21.3 91.6 27.4 82.4 19.5 
Control rights (1st) 27.3 24.6 6.34 87.4 11.4 31.2 15.4 
Control rights ( 2nd) 13.5 12.4 3.10 57.3 6.91 18.2 9.12 
Control rights (3rd) 6.71 6.40 2.11 43.1 2.91 9.13 4.32 
Cashflow rights (1st) 24.5 20.1 6.11 87.2 10.3 29.7 14.3 
Cashflow rights (2nd) 11.4 11.3 3.10 56.1 6.90 16.1 9.11 
Cashflow rights (3rd) 5.66 5.22 2.10 42.2 2.61 9.81 4.92 
Wedge 1 2.90 2.87 0.95 4.23 1.42 3.41 0.55 
Wedge 2 1.04 1.01 0.21 2.63 0.59 1.823 0.47 
Wedge 3 1.15 1.09 0.31 2.19 0.47 1.445 0.43 
Excess Control 63.4 61.31 22.5 83.2 27.9 75.6 24.2 
Lower Control 21.7 21.3 3.35 34.4 9.51 32.3 9.41 
Panel B. Largest shareholders across Ownership and Control  
Family Control 43.3 44.5 7.32 83.4 20.8 58.5 21.3 
Family board representation 29.4 28.7 0 74.5 17.3 55.3 29.2 
Family managers 
representation 
17.1 12.4 0 27.3 8.41 26.4 9.51 
Pyramidal Ownership 22.7 21.3 0 52.4 10.8 30.6 23.7 
GLCs 24.1 22.4 0 42.1 10.6 29.8 35.3 
Non-Family 17.5 12.3 0 38.2 8.41 23.6 23.4 
Financial 11.4 10.5 0 17.3 5.47 15.3 9.4 
Others 7.80 7.21 0 12.7 3.74 10.5 6.2 
Independent variable  
Leverage (Book value) 33.2 29.9 0.002 71.3 14.9 44.7 15.3 
Leverage (Market value) 28.1 25.3 0.001 59.2 10.8 32.8 13.5 
Control variables        
Firm size 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.37 0.11 0.23 0.07 
MTB 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.01 
Tangibility 0.13 0.12 0.01 0.23 0.06 0.18 0.09 
NDTS 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.06 0.01 
Profitability 0.09 0.09 0.02 0.16 0.04 0.12 0.04 
Volatility 0.11 0.10 0.03 0.19 0.06 0.15 0.05    
Table 3 
Panel A of presents the capital stake of controlling shareholders for a threshold 
ranging from 0 to 100%. Panel B presents the leverage based on the controlling 
stake of the firms.     
Panel A: Frequency of Control 
rights   
Control threshold Proportion N  
20% - 30% 15.05 315 
30% - 40% 8.86 209 
40% - 50% 13.7 307 
50% - 60% 14.8 424 
60% - 70% 20.3 572 
70% - 80% 18.8 531 
Above 80% 8.32 234 
Panel B: Proportion of Leverage across Controlling 
Shareholdings  
Leverage threshold Leverage (Book 
value) 
Leverage (Market 
value) 
10% - 15% 33.2 27.9 
15% - 20% 33.3 27.9 
20% - 25% 34.2 28.5 
25% - 30% 34.5 28.7 
30% - 35% 34.8 28.6 
35% - 40% 34.8 28.3 
40% - 45% 31.2 28.1 
45% - 50% 31.1 27.3 
Above 50% 30.1 27.8 
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for the full sample and present the results in Table 5. Model 1–2 pre-
sents the regression with two alternate proxies of leverage: book and 
market value. The coefficients on CS_Own are negatively significant in 
both the models indicating that controlling shareholders prefer equity 
over leverage financing to maintain the optimal capital structure. This 
result suggests that controlling shareholders less rely on leverage fi-
nancing to minimize the likelihood of financial distress and default risk. 
In this scenario, when the controlling ownership exceeds a certain 
threshold, leverage becomes less important for controlling shareholders 
in terms of better CG practice. Importantly, this result contradicts the 
prior literature that controlling shareholders pursue non-dilutive en-
trenchment motives at the cost of minority shareholders' interest (see, 
for example, Boubaker, 2008; Bianco & Nicodano, 2006; Claessens 
et al., 2000; Claessens et al., 2002; Faccio & Lang, 2002; King & Santor, 
2008). In addition, the Singaporean code revised in 2012 mainly to 
ensure a balanced composition of corporate boards in terms of execu-
tive and independent INEDs. We, therefore, incorporate the dummy 
variable for regulations (2012) to determine whether the release of 
regulations impact on the relationship between control ownership and 
leverage decisions. The results show that coefficient on regulations 
(2012) is insignificant indicating that regulations have no impact on 
control ownership and leverage relationship. 
In terms of control variables, MTB and tangibility are positively 
significant while firm size, profitability and NDTS are negatively sig-
nificant. The positive coefficient on MTB exhibits that firms with higher 
market value tend to prefer higher leverage ratio whereas, the positive 
coefficient on tangibility implies that firms use the higher assets tan-
gibility as collateral of debt. The negative coefficient on firm size im-
plies that controlling shareholders reduce their cash flow rights with an 
increase in firm size. The profitability is negatively significant, sup-
porting the prediction of financial hierarchy theory that highly profit-
able firms tend to more rely on internal financial resources. The NDTS is 
negatively significant indicating that Singaporean firms are expected to 
receive a higher tax benefit from the debt financing thus prefer a higher 
level of leverage. Moreover, the coefficient on volatility is insignificant 
suggesting that uncertainties in the Singaporean corporate sector are 
relatively low as the Singaporean market is characterized by the strong 
institutional setting and better corporate culture. 
Table 4 
Panel A of presents a univariate analysis of mean and median difference tests across the firms' characteristics. We categories all observations into two main groups 
based on leverage level: excess leverage firms and low leverage firms. Panel B of Table 4 present a preliminary investigation to understand how controlling 
shareholders ownership influence leverage financing. Using the mean values, L_1 represents the book value of leverage while L_2 denotes the market value of leverage 
across all groups i.e. full sample, family ownership, GLCs and pyramidal ownership.            
Univariate Analysis:     
Panel A: Firms characteristics across Excess and Low Leverage level   
Variables Excess  Low  Difference  t-Stat  Z-stat  
Leverage (Market) 37.5  28.9  8.60  5.23**  2.76*** 
Leverage (Book) 32.9  23.3  9.60  2.44***  1.97* 
CS_Own 64.3  70.5  −6.20  4.11*  9.23*** 
Family Control 41.5  45.1  3.60  1.22*  6.38** 
Pyramidal Ownership 23.9  21.5  2.40  4.19***  3.99*** 
GLCs 23.9  24.3  −0.40  7.22**  4.28* 
Firm size 0.20  0.18  0.02  6.17*  4.12* 
MTB 0.04  0.02  0.02  1.86  8.89*** 
Tangibility 0.11  0.15  −0.04  2.14  6.05 
NDTS 0.04  0.04  0.00  5.11***  3.97** 
Profitability 0.07  0.11  −0.04  7.66*  2.36 
Volatility 0.11  0.11  0.00  4.39***  1.99*** 
Panel B: Mean Leverage threshold across Controlling Shareholders   
Controlling Stake Full Sample Family GLCs Pyramidal  
Decile L_1 L_2 L_1 L_2 L_1 L_2 L_1 L_2  
1 (Bottom) 38.4 34.6 39.5 35.7 38.2 34.4 39.4 35.6  
2 38.3 34.5 39.4 35.4 38.1 34.3 39.3 35.3  
3 36.2 32.4 36.3 33.3 36.4 32.6 36.2 33.4  
4 36.1 32.3 36.3 32.2 36.3 32.5 36.2 32.3  
5 34.5 30.7 35.2 31.4 34.4 30.6 35.3 31.4  
6 34.3 30.5 35.1 31.4 34.4 30.6 35.2 31.4  
7 30.1 26.3 29.4 25.1 30.2 26.4 29.5 25.2  
8 30.1 26.3 29.4 25.1 30.2 26.4 29.5 25.2  
9 29.5 25.7 28.2 24.7 29.4 25.6 28.2 24.6  
10 (Top) 29.5 25.7 28.2 24.7 29.4 25.6 28.2 24.6  
P-values are reported in parentheses, whereas, ***; **; * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,respectively.  
Table 5 
Presents our baseline estimation. Model 1–2 shows the regression using two 
different proxies of leverage e.g. Book value of leverage define as the ratio of 
total debt scaled by total debt plus book value of equity and Market value of 
leverage define as the ratio of total debt scaled by total debt plus the market 
value of equity. FCO is family control ownership. Firm size is defined as the 
natural logarithm of the book value of total assets; MTB: market value of the 
equity scaled by book value of equity; Tangibility:ratio of fixed assets to total 
assets; NDTS (Non-debt tax shield): ratio of annual depreciation to total assets; 
Profitability: ratio of EBITDA to total assets; Volatility: standard deviation of 
the change in operating EBITDA over the previous four years. Year and industry 
dummies are included in all models. *** p  <  0.001; ** p  <  0.01; * p  <  0.05; 
(all two-tailed tests).     
Impact of control ownership (CS_Own) on firm's leverage (Baseline estimation) 
Variables (1) (2)  
CS_Own −0.019*** (0.001) −0.377** (0.021) 
Regulations-2012 0.311 (0.118) 0.402 (0.213) 
Firm size −0.616** (0.021) −0.031** (0.036) 
MTB 0.322* (0.086) 0.147** (0.019) 
Tangibility 0.399* (0.092) 0.025** (0.042) 
NDTS −0.162 (0.331) - 0.271** (0.022) 
Profitability −0.514* (0.089) - 0.106** (0.031) 
Volatility 0.532 (0.661) 0.427 (0.352) 
R-sq 0.43 0.57 
Observations 2592 2592 
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6.3. Impact of controlling shareholders' ownership on firm leverage across 
excess and lower level of control 
To gain further insight into the impact of controlling shareholders' 
ownership on leverage and to examine the significance of Type II 
agency conflict, we investigate whether the relationship between con-
trolling shareholders' ownership and leverage differs across excess and 
lower level of shareholders' control. Accordingly, we classify our 
sample into two categories i.e. excess controlling and lower controlling 
stakes. To test the robustness of results, all models are estimated based 
on two different scales of leverage i.e. book value and market value, 
respectively. In the previous analysis, we use static models to examine 
controlling shareholders' ownership and leverage relationship without 
considering the potential source of endogeneity. In the next line ana-
lysis, we gauge the relationship between controlling share ownership 
and firm leverage in the dynamic framework by employing a two-step 
system GMM estimator with bias-corrected robust standard errors. 
Table 6 shows that the coefficients on CS_Own for excess control are 
significantly negative across the models 1–6, except static model 2 
which is consistent with our baseline results reported in Table 5. These 
findings reflect that controlling shareholders with excess/higher con-
trolling stake focus on value maximisation rather using leverage as a 
tool of minority shareholders' expropriation. Importantly, this result is 
in contrast to the prior literature which documents that controlling 
shareholders prefer higher leverage financing to dilutes the power and 
authority of minority shareholders (Bianco & Nicodano, 2006;  
Boubaker, 2008; Faccio & Lang, 2002; King & Santor, 2008). In addi-
tion, this result shows that the controlling shareholders with excess 
control do less rely on leverage financing to minimize the likelihood of 
default risk. These findings also exhibit that when controlling owner-
ship exceeds a certain threshold, leverage financing becomes less im-
portant for controlling shareholders in terms of better CG practice. This 
situation motivates controlling shareholders to prefer equity over 
leverage financing to reduce the likelihood of financial distress. We 
report three potential explanations for this result. First, Witt (2012) 
reports that minority shareholder rights are well secured in the Singa-
porean market. In addition, the strong disclosure-based environment of 
Singapore accentuates the extensive disclosure reporting and efficient 
monitoring mechanisms which effectively protect minority’ interests, 
therefore leverage is less likely to be used for minority shareholders' 
expropriation. 
Second, like many developed economies, such as Australia, 
Denmark, UK and US, the Singaporean economy has a strong market- 
based financial system (World Bank, 2013), hence leverage financing is 
primarily used for an optimal capital structure in Singapore rather a 
tool of minority shareholders' expropriation. Third, from controlling 
shareholders perspective; leverage financing is a costly way of influ-
encing corporate policies, whilst the excess leverage financing accel-
erates the risk of financial distress and bankruptcy. Theoretically, this 
result is consistent with the static version of trade-off theory which 
Table 6 
Presents the impact of CS-Own on leverage across excess and lower controlling stake. Model 1–12 shows the regression using two different proxies of leverage e.g. 
Book value of leverage define as the ratio of total debt scaled by total debt plus book value of equity and Market value of leverage define as the ratio of total debt 
scaled by total debt plus the market value of equity. Year and industry dummies are included in all models. Dynamic estimations employed based on two-step system 
GMM estimator with bias-corrected robust standard errors. Arellano-Bond, first-order autocorrelation AR (1), second-order autocorrelation AR (2) and Hansen test of 
over-identifying restrictions have conducted to examine the validity and strength of instruments. Arellano-Bond AR (2) test the second-order serial correlation in the 
first-differenced residuals. The null hypothesis of Arellano-Bond AR (2) test the instruments validity by examining whether it's correlated with the error term, while 
the null hypothesis of the Hansen test suggests that instruments as a group are exogenous. Year and industry dummies are included in all models. P-values are 
reported in parentheses, whereas, ***; **; * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.               
Impact of excess and lower control on leverage          
Excess Control     Lower Control    
Static Dynamic Static Dynamic 
Variables OLS Fixed Effects GMM OLS Fixed Effects GMM  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)  
CS-Own −0.601* −1.441 −0.329** −0.261* −0.342** −0.140*** 0.113* 0.511* 0.023** 0.155* 0.013** 0.677*  
(0.061) (0.281) (0.012) (0.071) (0.022) (0.000) (0.091) (0.081) (0.016) (0.092) (0.024) (0.078) 
Firm size −0.451** −0.931** −0.251* −0.563 −0.261* −0.616** −0.212 0.616* −0.751* −0.233* −0.832* −0.145*  
(0.031) (0.031) (0.092) (0.991) (0.071) (0.022) (0.131) (0.081) (0.06) (0.077) (0.084) (0.071) 
MTB 0.654*** 0.651*** 0.044** 0.473*** 0.521* −0.641* 0.901*** 0.601*** −0.831* 0.557*** 0.611* 0.965**  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.036) (0.000) (0.088) (0.091) (0.002) (0.001) (0.064) (0.002) (0.091) (0.031) 
Tangibility 0.322* 0.315* 0.527* 0.021* 0.586** 0.854* 1.121*** 0.451** −0.210** 0.912*** 0.052* 0.831*  
(0.076) (0.071) (0.087) (0.063) (0.042) (0.061) (0.002) (0.031) (0.033) (0.001) (0.065) (0.083) 
NDTS 0.031 −0.257* −0.116 −0.042*** −0.563* −0.733** −0.162*** −0.421** −0.376** −0.686*** −0.048*** −0.107*  
(0.361) (0.091) (0.453) (0.000) (0.081) (0.043) (0.001) (0.011) (0.042) (0.000) (0.000) (0.063) 
Profitability 0.215 −0.905* −0.322* −0.135 −0.629* −0.904*** −0.454** −0.833* 0.622*** −0.876* −0.383*** −0.275**  
(0.431) (0.079) (0.082) (0.308) (0.093) (0.001) (0.034) (0.061) (0.001) (0.073) (0.000) (0.041) 
Volatility 0.185 0.125 0.986 0.144 −0.185 0.108 0.454 −0.214 0.023 0.159 0.282 0.297  
(0.231) (0.432) (0.271) (0.399) (0.231) (0.895) (0.311) (0.312) (0.116) (4.358) (0.637) (0.132) 
Regulations-2012 0.305 0.441 0.921 0.527 0.467 0.308 0.211 0.601 0.409 0.202 0.339 0.287  
(0.122) (0.302) (0.411) (0.301) (0.220) (0.107) (0.324) (0.288) (0.198) (0.331) (0.402) (0.161) 
Leverage (t-1)     0.854** 0.792*     0.831** 0.889***      
(0.032) (0.099)     (0.041) (0.003) 
R-Sq 0.41 0.37 0.48 0.51   0.29 0.31 0.45 0.37   
Observations 2204 2204 2204 2204 2204 2204 390 390 390 390 390 390 
AR (1) test (p- 
value)     
0.05 0.01     0 0.03 
AR (2) test (p- 
value)     
0.77 0.85     0.47 0.98 
Hansen-J test     0.63 0.98     0.39 0.45 
Diff-in-Hansen test     0.43 0.74     0.49 0.12 
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emphasize to equate between the cost of financial distress and tax 
shielding for an optimal capital arrangement. Importantly, these find-
ings are incongruent with the previous empirical evidence which es-
tablished that control ownership with excess control rights could 
threaten the interests of minority shareholders (see, for example,  
Abdullah & Pok, 2015; Boubaker, 2008; and Brailsford et al., 2002). We 
argue that the Singaporean market has a comparative advantage over 
the fellow emerging market in terms of strong institutional framework 
and better CG mechanisms which in turn, better converge with the 
interests of economic actors. 
On the other hand, in the case of lower control, the coefficients on 
CS_Own are positive across the models 7–12, indicating that controlling 
shareholders with a lower fraction of equity prefer leverage over equity 
to inflate their equity stake. We report two potential explanations of 
this result. First, despite the fact that the Singaporean market is widely 
recognized as a country with effective CG mechanisms, the compliance 
of Singaporean CG is voluntary which may allow more leeway for non- 
majority controlling shareholders to prefer leverage financing to protect 
them from potential takeovers and mergers. Second, at some point, it's 
more likely that the majority controlling shareholder would not have 
any objection on minority controlling shareholders' preference for 
leverage over equity financing as leverage accompanied the benefit of 
tax shields. Importantly, we argue that this result displays the unique 
setting of the Singaporean market which alters the prior empirical re-
search reflecting the distinct role of non-majority controlling share-
holders who prefer leverage to inflate their controlling stake. Based on 
these findings we accept hypothesis 1. We observe that the explanatory 
power of regressors are relatively higher in the case of dynamic esti-
mation than static models. The results also show that coefficients on 
regulations (2012) are insignificant across all the models indicating that 
regulations have no impact on control ownership and leverage re-
lationship. Furthermore, the coefficients on control variables are almost 
similar to those reported in Table 5. 
6.4. Effects of separation of ownership and control 
In the next step, we investigate the impact of the separation of 
ownership and control on the firm leverage and present the results in  
Table 7. The degree of separation of cash flow rights and control rights 
is measured using three alternate proxies wedge scale. The prior lit-
erature document that wedge reflects the likelihood and extent of ex-
propriation by the majority controlling shareholders (see, for example,  
Boubakri and Ghouma, 2010; Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio & Lang, 
2002). 
Models 1–6 show the impact of the separation of ownership and 
control rights on firm leverage decisions across two alternate measures 
of leverage e.g., book and market value. The result clearly shows that 
the coefficients on wedge scale1–3 appear to be insignificant across all 
the models except model 6, indicating that the separation of cash flow 
rights and the control rights are not affecting firm leverage decision. In 
general, a higher magnitude of separation of ownership and control 
gives more discretion to the controlling shareholders to influence the 
firm key decision which is not the case in the Singaporean market. 
This insignificant relationship between the separation of ownership 
and control and leverage financing reflecting that controlling share-
holders are not extracting private benefit of control at the cost of the 
minority shareholder by employing leverage financing. Therefore, this 
result supports the likelihood of the alignment of interest between the 
majority controlling shareholders and external/minority shareholders. 
The potential explanation of this result is that the strong institutional 
arrangements and judicial environment of Singaporean market ade-
quately protect the minority’ interest thus the separation between 
ownership and control is not becoming the cause of minority share-
holders' expropriation. Notably, these findings are in contrast to the 
classical notion of agency theory that separation of ownership and 
control lead to minority shareholders' expropriation. Hypothesis 2 
predicted that a higher magnitude of separation between cash flow 
rights and control rights positively associate with leverage. Our findings 
failed to support hypothesis 2 since the coefficients on wedge1–3 are 
insignificant across the models 1–5. Moreover, the control variables are 
significant with expected signs. 
6.5. U-shaped non-linear relationship between ownership control and 
leverage 
We next examine whether there is U-shaped non-linear relationship 
between ownership control and leverage and present the results in  
Table 8. The results show that coefficients on CS_Own are positively 
significant across the models 1–2, i.e. (β = 0.865, p  <  0.01, model 1), 
(β = 0.477, p  <  0.10, model 2), indicating that leverage increases 
along with the shareholders' controlling stake. Moreover, this re-
lationship varies between high and low level of CS_Own and becomes 
more robust when the control rights of shareholders are more than their 
cash flow rights. The coefficients on CS_Own2 are negatively significant 
for model 1 (β = −0.144, p  <  0.01, model 1), and model 2 
(β = −0.123, p  <  0.10, model 2), corroborating an inverted U-shaped 
association (non-monotonic) between controlling shareholders owner-
ship and leverage. This result shows that controlling shareholders 
prefer to increase the leverage financing to maintain an optimal capital 
structure reflecting as ‘monitoring effect’ and at a certain threshold, 
tend to reduce the leverage level, indicating as ‘risk reduction/incentive 
effect’. More specifically, at first, the firms' leverage increase with 
CS_Own and then at a certain threshold level, leverage starts decreasing 
with the proportion of capital stake of the controlling shareholders 
(Agca & Mansi, 2008; Brailsford et al., 2002). Based on these findings, 
we accept the hypothesis 3. 
6.6. Moderating effect of family ownership on CS_Own and leverage 
relationship 
Finally, we test the moderating effect of family ownership on the 
relationship between controlling shareholders' ownership and leverage. 
Accordingly, we incorporate family ownership as a dummy variable 
and interaction terms of CS_Own and family-controlled ownership 
(CS_Own × FCO) to estimate the model: 
= + + × + + +Debts (k) CS_Own ( CS_Own FCO ) FCO ControlsX itit 1 it 2 it it 5 it k,it (3)  
In addition, we develop a dynamic model to address the potential 
source of endogeneity: 
= + + × +
+ +
Debts (k) Debts (k) CS_Own ( CS_Own FCO ) FCO
ControlsX it
it it 1 1 it 2 it it 5 it
k,it (4)  
Table 9 present the results of the moderating effect of family own-
ership on the relationship between CS_Own and leverage across the 
static and dynamic models using two proxies of leverage i.e. book and 
market value across all the estimation techniques. Column 1–4 of  
Table 9 presents the results of static models e.g. OLS and fixed effects 
estimation, while columns 5–8 exhibits the findings of dynamic models 
e.g. fixed effects and GMM estimator. Moreover, GMM is our main es-
timation model while dynamic fixed effects model is used to test the 
robustness of our results. 
Column 7 shows a significant positive coefficient on CS_Own (e.g., 
β = 0.543, p  <  0.05, model 7), while a significant negative coefficient 
on CS_Own2 (e.g., β = −0.307, p  <  0.01, model 7) indicating an in-
verted U-shaped association between CS_Own and leverage decisions. 
Likewise, column 8 also shows a significant positive coefficient on 
CS_Own (e.g., β = 0.213, p  <  0.01, model 8), while a significant ne-
gative coefficient on CS_Own2 (e.g., β = −0.643, p  <  0.05, model 8). 
These findings are consistent with the results report in Table 8. More-
over, these findings suggest that controlling shareholders first rely on 
leverage to accelerate controlling stake and then reduce the leverage 
level once their control level reaches the optimal threshold to avoid the 
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higher cost of debt and default risk. We incorporate family-controlled 
ownership (FCO) as an interaction terms and our results show that the 
coefficient on (CS_Own × FCO) is significantly negative (e.g., 
β = −0.055, p  <  0.01, model 7) and (e.g., β = −0.032, p  <  0.01, 
model 7) indicating that family firms prefer equity over leverage to 
avoid risk of financial distress and default. This result is consistent with 
our univariate analysis of Table 4 as well. Broadly speaking, the re-
lationship between family-controlled ownership and leverage is more 
pronounced for family firms due to the poorly diversified investment 
portfolio in the Singaporean market. This result is in contrast to the 
prior research due to the unique characteristics of Singapore (see, for 
example, Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Croci et al., 2011; King & Santor, 
2008; Setia-Atmaja (2010), while consistent with the findings of  
Ampenberger et al. (2011). Based on these findings, we accept hy-
pothesis 4. 
6.7. Robustness tests 
We perform a number of robustness tests to check the sensitivity of 
our results. First, we re-estimate the Eq. (4) with the median value of 
leverage based on book and market value. Second, we replace the proxy 
of family-controlled ownership by excluding the condition that the fa-
mily members hold the CEO or chairman position and own at least 5% 
equity stake. Based on this criterion, the mean of sample family-con-
trolled firms increases from 43.2% to 51.3%. Turning to our control 
variable, we replace the proxy ‘tangibility’ by taking the ratio of fixed 
assets (such as property, plant and equipment) scaled by net assets 
instead of total Assets. We re-estimate the model by considering these 
adjustments and present the findings in Table 10. We can see that 
Table 7 
Presents the results of impact of separation of control and ownership rights on leverage decisions across two different proxies of leverage e.g., Book value of leverage 
define as the ratio of total debt scaled by total debt plus book value of equity and Market value of leverage define as the ratio of total debt scaled by total debt plus the 
market value of equity. The magnitude of separation of control rights and cash flow rights is measured using three different proxies such as wedge scale 1–3, where 
wedge scale 1 is the fractional difference between control rights and cash flow rights. The wedge scale 2 defined as the percentage of cash flow rights scaled by 
control rights of largest shareholders while wedge scale 3 is the dummy variable that equals to 1 if control rights of largest shareholders are greater than cash flow 
rights. Year and industry dummies are included in all models. P-values are reported in parentheses, whereas, ***; **; * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively.         
Impact of separation of Control and Ownership rights on Leverage  
Variables Leverage (Book value) Leverage (Market value)  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
Wedge 1 0.132   0.134    
(0.641)   (0.750)   
Wedge 2  0.281   0.049    
(0.165)   (0.422)  
Wedge 3   0.019   0.792*    
(0.249)   (0.099) 
Firm size −0.137*** −0.014* - 0.143** −0.486* 0.324 −0.973**  
(0.000) (0.091) (0.041) (0.089) (0.432) (0.041) 
MTB 0.149** −0.343 0.055*** 0.376** 0.134* 0.116  
(0.017) (0.262) (0.001) (0.011) (0.079) (0.119) 
Tangibility 0.774** 0.056** 0.311*** 0.248 0.482* 0.018*  
(0.027) (0.019) (0.000) (0.432) (0.061) (0.086) 
NDTS −1.581*** −0.312** −0.292* −0.371 −0.421** −0.329*  
(0.000) (0.016) (0.099) (0.324) (0.019) (0.076) 
Profitability −0.034 −0.207* −0.091*** −0.267* −0.115*** −0.342  
(0.275) (0.089) (0.002) (0.086) (0.000) (0.553) 
Volatility 0.341 0.123 0.903 0.187* 0.116 0.721  
(0.312) (0.066) (0.641) (0.059) (0.414) (0.197) 
Regulations 2012 0.322 0.405 0.203 0.422 0.331 0.261  
(0.118) (0.211) (0.192) (0.186) (0.202) (0.172) 
Leverage (t-1) 0.783*** 0.799** 0.812* 0.841*** 0.896*** 0.854**  
(0.000) (0.032) (0.056) (0.000) (0.000) (0.043) 
Observations 2592 2592 2592 2592 2592 2592 
AR (1) test (p-value) 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.09 0.01 0.02 
AR (2) test (p-value) 0.32 0.82 0.33 0.45 0.93 0.42 
Hansen-J test (over identification) 0.53 0.44 0.27 0.72 0.84 0.14 
Diff-in-Hansen test (p-value) 0.48 0.37 0.63 0.34 0.59 0.16 
Table 8 
Presents the association between CS_Own and its square e.g., CS_Own2 across 
two models e.g., Book value of leverage and Market value of leverage. Firm size 
is defined as the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets; MTB: 
market value of the equity scaled by book value of equity; Tangibility:ratio of 
fixed assets to total assets; NDTS (Non-debt tax shield): ratio of annual depre-
ciation to total assets; Profitability: ratio of EBITDA to total assets; Volatility: 
standard deviation of the change in operating EBITDA over the previous four 
years. Year and industry dummies are included in all models. P-values are re-
ported in parentheses, whereas, ***; **; * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively.      
Non-linear U-shaped association between CS_Own and leverage 
Variables (1)  (2)  
CS_Own 0.865** (0.000)  0.477* (0.063) 
CS_Own2 −0.144*** (0.001)  −0.123** (0.041) 
Firm size −0.212* (0.062)  −0.532*** (0.002) 
MTB 0.042 (0.343)  0.251** (0.046) 
Tangibility 0.532*** (0.000)  0.124* (0.078) 
NDTS −0.251* (0.066)  −0.317* (0.064) 
Profitability −0.914*** (0.000)  −0.441* (0.057) 
Volatility 0.214 (0.439)  0.012 (0.914) 
Regulations 2012 0.203 (0.129)  0.421 (0.217) 
Observations 2592  2592 
Leverage (t-1) 0.914***  0.889**  
(0.003)  (0.042) 
AR (1) test (p-value) 0.09  0.04 
AR (2) test (p-value) 0.67  0.93 
Hansen-J test (over identification) 0.45  0.76 
Diff-in-Hansen test (p-value) 0.44  0.65 
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results remained similar in terms of magnitudes and respective signs of 
the variables of the study. These results corroborate our main findings 
i.e. a U-shaped non-linear association between CS_Own and leverage 
decisions and suggesting that family-controlled ownership enhances the 
negative relationship between controlling ownership and leverage. 
Therefore, our robustness test regarding variables of interest (leverage, 
family-controlled firms and Tangibility) are robust to the alternative 
proxies for the association between controlling shareholders' ownership 
and leverage. 
A potential shortcoming of GMM estimator is instrument prolifera-
tion which may bias the estimated coefficients (Amin & Williamson, 
2020; Nguyen et al., 2015). We followed the seminal study of Roodman 
(2009) regarding the application of GMM approach and test the sensi-
tivity of our results by reducing the numbers of GMM-instruments. We 
used the ‘collapse’ option across all GMM estimation to address the 
problem of instrument proliferation which otherwise may weaken the 
strength of the GMM instruments (Roodman, 2009; Wintoki, Linck, & 
Netter, 2012).3 Therefore, in the next line robustness test, we conduct 
our second sensitivity test by ignoring the ‘collapse’ option and present 
the results in Table 11. The results show that p-values of explanatory 
and control variables are slightly changed, but their coefficient signs 
and level of significance remains the same. For example, the sig-
nificance level of CS-Own and family-controlled ownership is reduced 
from 1% to 10%. The coefficient on the NTDS flip from significant to 
insignificance but still shows a negative sign confirming that overall, 
our findings are robust to model estimation. Taken together, our find-
ings are remained unchanged despite the adjustment in model specifi-
cation, suggesting that our results are robust to the alternate proxy i.e. 
reduction in GMM instruments. 
7. Conclusion and discussion 
In this study, we investigate the association between controlling 
shareholders' ownership and firm leverage decisions in the Singaporean 
context. We contribute to the literature by examining both the direct 
impact of control ownership on leverage and the interaction effect of 
family-controlled firms on the control ownership and leverage re-
lationship. Our core findings reveal that impact of control ownership on 
leverage financing differs across excess and lower level of control 
ownership. More specifically, the relationship between excess control 
and leverage is significantly negative suggesting that controlling 
shareholders with an excess controlling stake do less rely on leverage 
financing to minimize the likelihood of financial distress and default 
risk. Our evidence shows that controlling shareholders of the 
Singaporean market tend to use leverage financing for an optimal ca-
pital structure and focus on value maximisation rather using leverage as 
a tool of minority shareholders' expropriation. We thus conclude that 
capital structure decisions in Singapore are linked with the trade-off 
between the controlling shareholders' target of mitigating firm risk and 
their non-dilution entrenchment needs. In additions, this outcome is 
contrary to the prior literature which documents that controlling 
Table 9 
Presents the results of the moderating effect of family-controlled ownership on the relationship between CS-Own and leverage across static and dynamic model by 
estimating Eq. 3 and Eq. 4 respectively. An interaction terms of family control ownership (e.g., CS-Own × FCO) included in the model. The results are estimated both 
in static and dynamic context. Dynamic estimations based on two-step system GMM estimator with bias-corrected robust standard errors. Year and industry dummies 
are included in all models. P-values are reported in parentheses, whereas, ***; **; * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.           
Moderating effect of family-controlled ownership     
Static Dynamic  
OLS Fixed Effects Fixed Effects GMM  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  
CS-Own 0.014* 0.621* 0.033* 0.452** 0.284* 0.129*** 0.543** 0.213***  
(0.061) (0.099) (0.089) (0.039) (0.083) (0.000) (0.029) (0.002) 
CS_Own2 −0.741* −0.314** −0.342** −0.239* −0.621** - 0.137** −0.307*** - 0.643**  
(0.067) (0.032) (0.041) (0.078) (0.031) (0.011) (0.000) (0.022) 
FCO −0.581* −0.542* −0.366** −0.247** −0.243*** −0.219* −0.443*** −0.786***  
(0.074) (0.098) (0.049) (0.042) (0.000) (0.910) (0.000) (0.000) 
(CS-Own × FCO) −0.925 −0.258 −0.532* −0.254* −0.042*** −0.098*** −0.055*** −0.032***  
(0.124) (0.371) (0.077) (0.099) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) 
Firm size −0.196 −0.283 −0.451* −0.613* −0.213* −0.043** −0.457* −0.029**  
(0.162) (0.215) (0.092) (0.062) (0.095) (0.023) (0.065) (0.031) 
MTB 0.312** 0.049** 0.221 0.312 0.672 0.022** 0.435 0.047**  
(0.044) (0.013) (0.342) (0.412) (0.185) (0.033) (0.185) (0.046) 
Tangibility 0.338*** 0.622** 0.551 0.297 0.236*** 0.176** 0.332*** 0.433***  
(0.000) (0.012) (0.315) (0.135) (0.002) (0.032) (0.002) (0.004) 
NDTS −0.233** −0.349 −0.732** 0.412 −0.116*** −0.463** −0.654* −0.543**  
(0.021) (0.145) (0.029) (0.129) (0.000) (0.031) (0.054) (0.022) 
Profitability −0.481 −0.532 −0.621 −0.432* −0.474*** −0.127*** −0.543* −0.127***  
(0.421) (0.348) (0.332) (0.088) (0.000) (0.001) (0.067) (0.031) 
Volatility 0.376 0.553 0.511 0.489 0.087 0.039 0.022 0.043  
(0.721) (0.226) (0.132) (0.342) (0.224) (0.44) (0.274) (0.162) 
Regulations 2012 0.309 0.233 0.502 0.428 0.398 0.219 0.441 0.306  
(0.221) (0.399) (0.188) (0.221) (0.409) (0.189) (0.220) (0.161) 
Leverage (t-1)      0.822** 0.896***        
(0.027) (0.000) 
R-Sq 0.44 0.59 0.54 0.37 0.33 0.37   
AR (1) test (p-value)      0.002 0.000 
AR (2) test (p-value)       0.182 0.442 
Hansen-J test (over identification)     0.253 0.678 
Diff-in-Hansen test (p-value)       0.134 0.513 
Observations 2592 2592 2592 2592 2592 2592 2592 2592 
3 See Roodman (2009b) for further explanation about the techniques for re-
ducing the instrument count for GMM estimator. 
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shareholders prefer higher leverage financing to dilutes the power and 
authority of minority shareholders (see, for example, Boubaker, 2008;  
Bianco & Nicodano, 2006; Faccio & Lang, 2002; King & Santor, 2008). 
We extend the literature by establishing that the prediction of 
agency theory is conditional with the weak legal and institutional set-
ting while the Singaporean market is underpinned by the strong in-
stitutional and governance arrangements which provide safety against 
abuse of power. We also argue that from controlling shareholders 
perspective; the leverage financing is a costly way to influencing cor-
porate policies whilst the excess leverage financing accelerates the risk 
of financial distress and bankruptcy. 
With regard to the estimation of lower control, our analysis shows 
that the relationship between lower control and leverage is significantly 
positive. This result suggests that the controlling shareholders with a 
lower fraction of equity are more concerned about limited holding thus 
prefers leverage over equity financing to inflate their equity stake to 
protect them from the potential takeovers and mergers. Further, we 
argue that firms' capital structure is significantly influenced by the 
coalition of shareholders particularly decisions about leverage finan-
cing in addition to the firms' specific characteristics and institutional 
arrangements. This is a novel contribution to the capital structure lit-
erature as no prior research has elaborated the leverage decisions across 
excess and lower level of control. 
We also examine the impact of the separation of ownership and 
control on leverage decisions measured using three different wedge 
scales. Our results show an insignificant relationship between the se-
paration of ownership and control reflecting that controlling 
shareholders are not extracting private benefit by leverage financing. 
We report that strong disclosure-based environment and efficient 
monitoring mechanisms in Singapore effectively protect minority’ in-
terests, thus separation of ownership and control has no significant 
impact on leverage financing. Notably, these findings are in contrast to 
the classical notion of agency theory whereby separation of ownership 
and control provide an opportunity for controlling shareholders to 
pursue their personal incentive which leads to Type II agency problem. 
Further, our analysis substantiates an inverted U-shaped (non- 
monotonic) association between control ownership and leverage. We 
report that controlling shareholders first increase the leverage financing 
to maintain an optimal capital structure reflecting monitoring effect, 
and at a certain threshold, prefer to reduce the leverage financing in-
dicating the risk reduction/incentive effect. This result is in contrast to 
the prior study of La Porta et al. (1999) who document that presence of 
controlling ownership leads to the entrenchment effect particularly in 
the emerging markets. 
We also report a negative interaction effect of family-controlled 
firms suggesting that family controlling shareholders are more averse 
towards the higher level of leverage due to the risk of financial distress 
and bankruptcy and as a result of having poorly and under-diversified 
leadership portfolio. Given the strong institutional arrangements and 
higher creditor rights in the Singaporean market, family firms have not 
the traditional issues such as restricted access to the capital market and 
lenders' monitoring which is incongruent to the issues of other emer-
ging markets. Further, this result supports the findings of Anderson and 
Reeb (2003) that family-controlled firms mitigate agency issues with 
Table 10 
Presents sensitivity tests to examine the robustness of our results based on Eq.(4) by replacing the proxy of a few variables: (1) Replacing the median value of leverage 
based on book and market value. (2) The proxy of family-controlled ownership is changed by excluding the condition that the family members hold the CEO or 
chairman position and own at least 5% equity stake. (3) The proxy of ‘Tangibility’ is changed by taking the ratio of fixed assets (property, plant and equipment) scaled 
by net assets instead of total Assets.           
Robustness Test (with alternative variables proxy)     
Static Dynamic  
OLS Fixed Effects Fixed Effects GMM  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  
CS-Own 0.023** −0.631* 0.031* 0.432** 0.285* 0.122*** 0.522* 0.244***  
(0.041) (0.091) (0.082) (0.031) (0.080) (0.000) (0.091) (0.004) 
CS_Own2 −0.743* −0.322** 0.321** 0.232* −0.632** - 0.131** −0.431** - 0.621**  
(0.033) (0.021) (0.021) (0.071) (0.022) (0.012) (0.032) (0.021) 
FCO −0.584* −0.532* −0.321** −0.241** −0.211*** −0.212*** −0.432** −0.744**  
(0.066) (0.091) (0.032) (0.043) (0.000) (0.000) (0.021) (0.033) 
(CS-Own × FCO) −0.921 −0.241 −0.521* −0.293* −0.034*** −0.091*** −0.052*** −0.031***  
(0.425) (0.161) (0.071) (0.091) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) 
Firm size −0.197* −0.282** 0.449 −0.614* −0.212* −0.042** −0.422* −0.023**  
(0.061) (0.014) (0.692) (0.061) (0.091) (0.022) (0.045) (0.021) 
MTB 0.309** 0.042** 0.222 0.314 0.670 0.021** 0.434 0.044**  
(0.041) (0.012) (0.341) (0.411) (0.184) (0.035) (0.181) (0.041) 
Tangibility 0.312*** 0.621** 0.521 0.294 0.217*** 0.133** 0.322*** 0.455***  
(0.000) (0.014) (0.313) (0.133) (0.001) (0.021) (0.001) (0.002) 
NDTS −0.221** 0.341 −0.721** 0.413 −0.113*** −0.643** −0.622* −0.541**  
(0.041) (0.121) (0.021) (0.124) (0.000) (0.022) (0.051) (0.022) 
Profitability −0.461 −0.521 0.622 −0.433* −0.443*** −0.132*** −0.521* −0.121***  
(0.429) (0.323) (0.331) (0.084) (0.000) (0.001) (0.061) (0.031) 
Volatility 0.371 0.536 0.512 0.481 0.081** 0.033*** 0.021* 0.041*  
(0.711) (0.212) (0.131) (0.341) (0.021) (0.000) (0.071) (0.061) 
Regulations 2012 0.291 0.187 0.501 0.339 0.527 0.464 0.387 0.235  
(0.221) (0.381) (0.452) (0.321) (0.122) (0.319) (0.461) (0.234) 
Leverage (t-1)      0.821** 0.852***        
−0.032 0.061 
R-Sq 0.49 0.52 0.51 0.33 0.41 0.38   
AR (1) test (p-value)      0.001 0.000 
AR (2) test (p-value)       0.205 0.432 
Hansen-J test (over identification)     0.253 0.351 
Diff-in-Hansen test (p-value)       0.143 0.520 
Observations 2592 2592 2592 2592 2592 2592 2592 2592 
P-values are reported in parentheses, whereas, ***; **; * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,respectively.  
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the debt holders which reduce the cost of leverage financing. To our 
knowledge, the present study is the first to explore the family owner-
ship in the Singaporean context and determine its moderating impact 
on controlling shareholders and leverage relationship. 
In addition, we perform two independent robustness tests reflecting 
that our results are robust to the alternative proxies for the association 
between controlling shareholders' ownership and firm leverage. In 
terms of implications of this study, our empirical evidence shows that 
the shareholders with a lower controlling stake in Singapore prefer 
leverage over equity financing to inflate their equity stake. This reflects 
that regardless of disclosure-based environment and governance ar-
rangements in Singapore, minority shareholders are not fully protected 
thus concerned about their limited holding. Given that the present 
study emphasis on leverage financing, we suggest that future studies 
can obtain the firms' equity data to look into issues related to optimal 
capital structure with the comparison of leverage financing. We ac-
knowledge a few limitations of this research. First, we exclude the non- 
listed firms which plays an important role in economic development. 
Second, we also exclude GLCs in our model estimation due to the dif-
ference in ownership structure. 
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